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Abstract
We present the mathematical model of decision making (DM) of
agents acting in a complex and uncertain environment (combining
huge variety of economical, financial, behavioral, and geo-political fac-
tors). To describe interaction of agents with it, we apply the formalism
of quantum field theory (QTF). Quantum fields are of the purely in-
formational nature. The QFT-model can be treated as a far relative
of the expected utility theory, where the role of utility is played by
adaptivity to an environment (bath). However, this sort of utility-
adaptivity cannot be represented simply as a numerical function. The
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operator representation in Hilbert space is used and adaptivity is de-
scribed as in quantum dynamics. We are especially interested in sta-
bilization of solutions for sufficiently large time. The outputs of this
stabilization process, probabilities for possible choices, are treated in
the framework of classical DM. To connect classical and quantum DM,
we appeal to Quantum Bayesianism (QBism). We demonstrate the
quantum-like interference effect in DM which is exhibited as a viola-
tion of the formula of total probability and hence the classical Bayesian
inference scheme.
1 Introduction
This paper is devoted to applications of the mathematical formalism of quan-
tum theory to the modeling of decision making (henceforth denoted as ‘DM’)
in a context where there exists deep uncertainty1 about both the possible
actions of other decision makers and the surrounding complex information
environment. This information environment can include belief-states of deci-
sion makers, memory recollections, and external economic (or also financial,
social and geopolitical) contexts2. In economics, the information environ-
ment is typically formalized via the introduction of the notions of i) public
(non-scarce) and private (scarce) information (flows); and the notions of
ii) produced information (a data-set which needs buying for instance) and
emergent information (time which reveals information for instance). The eco-
nomics and finance literature has published research on how one can measure
the economic value of information. The notion of ‘private information price
of risk’ for instance measures how private information triggers changes in the
price of risk within an asset pricing context (see Detemple and Rindisbacher
[2], [3]). The idea of ‘degrees of information’ is sometimes also considered
such as ‘first-order’ information (which ties the information to an event) and
‘higher-order’ information (which refers to the information itself (for instance
what is the source of the information)). The notion of ‘common knowledge’
which we briefly mention below is an example of such higher-order informa-
tion. For a detailed discussion of many of the basic concepts (see [4], p. 171-
and p.224-).
The idea of ‘information environment’ is also used in physics and very
often the terms ‘bath’ or ‘reservoir’ are used. In a social science adapted
1We will discuss below what we mean with ‘deep uncertainty’.
2The notion ‘state of the world’ used in economics (and decision making) and financial
asset pricing can be considered as the counterpart of these physical notions (see Machina
[1]).
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context (starting from physics) we can then speak of ‘mental bath’ or ‘mental
reservoir’.
In the model presented here in this paper, agents are not aiming to maxi-
mize their utility, but they instead adapt their behavior to information gained
from other agents and the environment. To describe this process of adaptiv-
ity, we adopt the mathematical apparatus of Quantum Field Theory (QFT).
In particular, the information environment is represented mathematically by
quantum fields. We call this approach QFT-inspired. It has to be sharply
distinguished from a variety of applications where genuine quantum physics
is applied to cognition and DM.
The adaptive approach which we will introduce, is more realistic com-
pared to the utility maximizing stance used in basic economics. However,
the ensuing formalism is much more demanding. As is well known, from a
basic economics perspective, the usual assumption made is that in the ab-
sence of any arbitrage3 opportunities there should exist a so called budget
feasible plan which can not be more preferred by any other budget feasible
plan (see Ma [6]).
From the brief discussion so far, it is intuitive, that our DM model will
differ crucially from the classical expected utility theory introduced by von
Neumann and Morgenstern [7]. Nevertheless, the QFT-inspired adaptive
model can be treated as a far relative of utility based models of DM, including
expected utility. The role of utility is played by the degree of adaptivity to
the surrounding (informational) environment, i.e. the mental bath. However,
it is impossible to encode ‘environment-adaptivity’ by a numerical utility-
function. As we will show, it is encoded by the dynamics of quantum decision
operators.
Within the mainstream literature, in cognitive psychology and behavioral
economics, several models have been developed to measure certain effects
such as ‘order’ effects and ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’ effects. Those are
effects which have been repeatedly observed in experimental lab settings and
some of those effects have relevance to some of the important paradoxes
which have affected the integrity of the axiomatic structure of key expected
utility models (such as the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility model
(Allais’ paradox, see [8]) and the Savage expected utility model (Ellsberg
paradox, see [9]). See also Machina [10]). A very rich literature has emerged
and we must mention the work of Tversky and Kahneman [11] and Tversky
3An arbitrage opportunity can be formally defined (see Bjo¨rk [5]). Essentially, an
arbitrage opportunity arises when no investment needs making to obtain a positive cash
flow. This is akin to a situation where a positive return on an investment exists without
the investment itself having any risk of its own. From a risk-reward perspective, there is
positive reward for no risk.
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and Shafir [12]. However, we need to note that those effects are now also
modelled with a so called ‘quantum-like’ approach. In essence, this approach
uses formalisms from quantum mechanics to augment the modelling of non-
physics problems, such as cognition. For representative work in this area see
[13]-[44] and references therein.
Finally, the quantum-like approach has recently been successfully ap-
plied to the theory of common knowledge and the modeling of violations
of Aumann’s theorem about the impossibility to agree on disagreeing (see
Khrennikov [36] and [37]).
As was already pointed out, we are interested in modeling the DM-process
as being adaptive to the information environment. An agent G is not driven to
maximize his utility, but he rather tries to adapt his behavior to information
which he is gaining (during the DM-process) from his environment R.
There are two well known main approaches to the modeling of quantum
adaptive dynamics. One approach is based on the theory of open quantum
systems. Here the state of an agent is extracted from the general state of the
compound system ‘agent+environment’ and the dynamics are reduced (by
using the trace operation) to the state space of this agent (the environment is
encoded in the operator-coefficients of the quantum master equation)4. An-
other approach is based on the study of the general dynamics of the state of
the compound system, ‘agent+environment’, and then averages and proba-
bilities corresponding to the agents’ decisions are extracted from the complete
dynamical state (see [45]). In the latter approach an environment is repre-
sented as a quantum field. In this paper we proceed with this QFT-inspired
approach by using the mathematical methods developed in recent papers by
Bagarello [19]-[21] and in the monograph [18].
The main advantage of the open quantum system approach is the reduc-
tion of the state-dimension to the dimension of the agent’s state. The main
problem is that an environment appears in a very formal encoding and it is
not easy to extract its features from the coefficients of the quantum master
equation. Thus, the model is phenomenological5.
The QFT-inspired approach is more difficult analytically, since the sce-
narios of evolution are presented by taking into account all degrees of freedom
of the environment6. It can be difficult to construct analytical solutions of
4This approach was used for a wide class of problems in DM, psychology, politics and
biology (see [14]-[17]; [32]; [38]).
5Another complication is that it is impossible to represent the quantum adaptive dy-
namics as dynamics of pure states. The impact of the environment can transfer a pure
initial state into a mixed quantum state (represented by a density operator).
6Such an environment contains both the complex internal mental representations of
agents as well as, e.g. the market situation or the current state of the political arena.
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the dynamical equations for the state evolution, even if in many relevant
cases this can be done (see sections 3 and 4). Sometimes, however, numer-
ical methods are really what is needed. This is the case, for instance, of
non-linear models, which will not play any role in this paper. Amongst the
advantages of the QFT-inspired approach, we can point to the possibility of
describing dynamics in terms of solely pure states.
At the beginning of this paper, we mentioned the idea of ‘deep uncer-
tainty’. From the quantum information point of view (see Chiribella et al.
[46]) a pure state represents the maximally available information about the
context (in our case the context of DM). But, the availability of maximal
information does not mean the resolution of uncertainty. We say that the
uncertainty can be very deep. The pure state representation means that max-
imal information (about the context) is encoded in it. The most tricky point
of quantum information theory (and, in fact, quantum theory in general)
is that there exist states of compound systems, e.g. ‘agent+environment’,
which are pure. This means they encode maximal information, but the states
of subsystems, e.g., the state of the agent, are not pure (i.e., they do not en-
code maximally available information about the situation). Such states of
compound systems are called entangled. Entanglement is nowadays consid-
ered as the main distinguishing feature of quantum theory.
Let us now come back to the objective of this paper. We will study a very
general DM-model represented in the form of a game played by two players
G1 and G2 interacting with two environments, R1 and R2. Such players can
be agents of a market, e.g. corporations, traders of the financial market,
political parties. A decision is taken only after the interactions Gj ↔ Rj
and G1 ↔ G2 are considered. The reflections of the agents generated by
the interactions modify the agents’ mental states. Thus, as was already
emphasized, the key-notion of such a decision making model is not utility,
but rather the interactions between agents and their environments and the
adaptivity to their impact7.
The QFT-inspired model for this sort of games involving decision making
under uncertainty (including the uncertainty generated by a complex sur-
rounding environment (be it mental, economic, social,...), was considered in
papers by [19], [20]. In these papers one of the main characteristics of the
analysis was that, at the beginning of the process of decision making t = 0,
each agent was in a sharp state. With this we mean that each agent knew, at
7It is important to stress that in quantum theory ‘interactions’ cannot be imagined
as actions of forces, as we known them in classical physics. For our applications, the
most useful is the information interpretation of quantum theory (See Chiribella et al.
[46]; Brukner and Zeilinger [47]). See Plotnitsky [40] for applications of the information
interpretation of quantum theory to DM.
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t = 0, exactly which was her own choice. Thus, initially, an agent was able
to resolve her internal mental uncertainty. Then, in the process of decision
making, her certainty was destroyed as the result of reflections generated by
interactions with another agent and the environment.
Of course, this initial certainty of the agent’s state is a strongly simplifying
assumption which does not match reality (e.g. when we consider traders in
the financial market).
In this paper we present a more realistic model by considering the possi-
bility that, initially, an agent is also being in a state of uncertainty which is
mathematically represented as a superposition of quantum(-like) pure states
corresponding to the concrete choices. Such a superposition encodes a very
deep uncertainty which cannot be modeled in the framework of classical
probability (CP) (see [27]; [35]). The superposition of decisions induces a
kind of interference between possible decisions of agents (see section 4). In
probabilistic terms, this interference is visible as a violation of the classical
formula of total probability: it is perturbed by an additional term. We will
see that, in comparison with [19], [20] and [21], the dynamical behavior of
the decision functions (DFs, see below) changes drastically. In particular,
a sort of overall noise appears because of the presence of some interference
effects in the system.
2 Why quantum(-like)?
The original general idea of Bagarello [18] was to formally use creation and
annihilation operators, the basic building blocks of QFT, in macroscopic sys-
tems so one can possibly consider dynamical systems. These operators can
be used to represent very complex dynamical processes composed of elemen-
tary acts of creation and annihilation of new states of systems. These states
can be of any nature: physical, mental, biological. This is the minimal in-
terpretation of the QFT-inspired approach. From this formal viewpoint, the
application of the mathematical formalism of quantum theory is just a mat-
ter of convenience, and in fact it proved to be useful in several applications
in different contexts [18]-[21].
In our concrete model the states under consideration are possible strate-
gies of players G1 and G2. The creation and annihilation operators are explored
to model the process of how players reflect upon their strategies. These re-
flections are composed of elementary acts of transition of the player’s mental
state from one strategy to another (“annihilation” of the previously cho-
sen strategy and “creation” of the opposite strategy). We remark that this
model, as well as the quantum physical model in general, is epistemic, i.e., it
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does not represent the internal (and extremely complex) processes in the neu-
ral system leading to such transitions. It provides only the formal operator
representation of these transitions. However, this formal model is rather rich
mathematically, see sections 3, 4. We can make the argument, that without
such an operational reduction of complexity it would be really impossible
to proceed to concrete solutions of dynamical equations. This operational
reduction of complexity is one the most important features motivating the
exploration of the quantum formalism.
However, the application of this formalism has also deeper foundational
consequences. The creation and annihilation operators act on some complex
Hilbert space. Therefore, the states of this space can form superpositions. In
the quantum formalism, the presence of superpositions of states lead to non-
classical probabilistic effects. One of them is the interference of probabilities.
In quantum physics this interference effect can be written as a violation of
the formula of total probability. The latter is one of the basic laws of classical
probability.
As was mentioned in the introduction, the consideration of superposi-
tions of states is very natural for the modeling of mental phenomena. They
represent uncertainty at the level of an individual decision maker. And, for
superpositions, our model exhibits the aforementioned deviation from clas-
sical probability theory, in the form of the violation of the formula of total
probability, see section 5.3.
We also remark that the use of superpositions as initial states generates
oscillations, see Figures 1, 2 and 3, section 4, which are absent for dynamics
starting with states representing “definite strategies”, [19].
In short, the use of the quantum formalism for decision making can be
justified as follows:
• It provides a powerful operational tool for the representation of reflec-
tions of decision makers.
• It provides the unique possibility to represent uncertainty in the mental
representation of the decision problem of an individual decision maker.8
8We remark that classical probability theory also can be used to represent uncertainty.
But a probability measure represents uncertainty in an ensemble, i.e., a statistical un-
certainty (and not in individual setting). It seems that the quantum representation of
uncertainty matches the modeling of uncertainty “in the head of an individual”, see sec-
tion 5.1 for further discussion.
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3 QFT-inspired model of decision making in
two players game and its dynamics
In this section we will discuss the details of our (QFT-inspired) model, con-
structing first the vectors of the players, the Hamiltonian of the system, and
deducing out of it, the differential equations of motion and their solution,
and we will be particularly interested in its asymptotic (in time t) behavior.
In our game we have two players, G1 and G2. Each player could operate,
at t = 0, two possible choices, 0 and 1. Hence, we have four different pos-
sibilities, to which, following Bagarello [19], we associate four different and
mutually orthogonal vectors in a four dimensional Hilbert space HG. These
vectors are ϕ0,0, ϕ1,0, ϕ0,1 and ϕ1,1. The first vector, ϕ0,0, describes the fact
that, at t = 0, the two players have both chosen 0 (0102). Of course, such
a choice can change during the time evolution of the system. Analogously,
ϕ0,1 describes the fact that, at t = 0, the first player has chosen 0, while
the second has chosen 1 (0112). And so on. Fϕ = {ϕk,l, k, l = 0, 1} is an
orthonormal basis for HG. The general mental state vector of the system SG
(i.e. of the two players), for t = 0, is a linear combination
Ψ0 =
1∑
k,l=0
αk,lϕk,l, (1)
where it is natural to assume that
∑1
k,l=0 |αk,l|2 = 1 in order to normalize the
total probability. Indeed, for instance, we interpret |α0,0|2 as the probability
that SG is, at t = 0, in a state ϕ0,0, i.e. that both G1 and G2 have chosen 0.
Analogous interpretations can be given to the other coefficients.
We construct the states ϕk,l by using two fermionic operators, i.e. two
operators b1 and b2, satisfying the following canonical anti-commutation rules
(CAR):
{bk, b†l} = δk,l 1 , {bk, bl} = 0, (2)
where k, l = 0, 1. Here 1 is the identity operator and {x, y} = xy + yx is
the anticommutator between x and y. Then we take ϕ0,0 as the vacuum of
b1 and b2: b1ϕ0,0 = b2ϕ0,0 = 0, and build up the other vectors out of it:
ϕ1,0 = b
†
1ϕ0,0, ϕ0,1 = b
†
2ϕ0,0, ϕ1,1 = b
†
1 b
†
2ϕ0,0.
Remarks:– (1) Notice that Fϕ could be equivalently constructed start-
ing from the vector ϕ1,1 ∈ H which is annihilated by b†1 and b†2, and then
constructing the other vectors of Fϕ by acting on ϕ1,1 with b1 and b2.
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(2) The reason why we introduce the operators in (2) is because they are
used to write down a Hamiltonian-like operator for the system S, from which
we deduce the dynamics of the observables of S, i.e. the variables needed to
describe S, and SG in particular, via the Heisenberg rule.
An explicit representation of these vectors and operators can be found
in many textbooks in quantum mechanics (see [59]). For instance: ϕk,l =
ϕ
(1)
k ⊗ ϕ(2)l , where ϕ0 =
(
1
0
)
and ϕ1 =
(
0
1
)
. Then,
ϕ1,0 = ϕ
(1)
1 ⊗ϕ(2)0 =
(
0
1
)
⊗
(
1
0
)
, ϕ1,1 = ϕ
(1)
1 ⊗ϕ(2)1 =
(
0
1
)
⊗
(
0
1
)
,
and so on. The matrix form of the operators bj and b
†
j are also quite simple.
For instance,
b1 =
(
0 1
0 0
)
⊗
(
1 0
0 1
)
, b2 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
⊗
(
0 1
0 0
)
,
and so on.
Let now nˆj = b
†
jbj be the number operator of the j-th player: the CAR
above implies that nˆ1ϕk,l = kϕk,l and nˆ2ϕk,l = lϕk,l, k, l = 0, 1. Then,
because of what we discussed before, the eigenvalues of these operators cor-
respond to the choice operated by the two players at t = 0. For instance, ϕ1,0
corresponds to the choice 1102, just because ‘one’ is the eigenvalue of nˆ1 and
‘zero’ is the eigenvalue of nˆ2. It is natural, therefore, to call nˆ1 and nˆ2 the
strategy operators (at t = 0). Moreover, since bj and b
†
j modify the attitude
of Gj, they can be called the reflection operators. We repeat that fermionic
operators are in use, since the eigenvalues of nˆj are exactly 0 and 1, which
are the only possible choices of the players of our game.
Our main effort now consists in giving a dynamics to the number op-
erators nˆj, following the scheme described in [18]. Therefore, what we
first need is to introduce a Hamiltonian H for the system. Then, we will
use this Hamiltonian to deduce the dynamics of the number operators as
nˆj(t) := e
iHtnˆje
−iHt, and finally we will compute the mean values of these
operators on some suitable state which describes (see below) the status of the
system at t = 0. We refer to [18, 19] for the details of our construction. Here
we just recall that H is the Hamiltonian of an open system, since the two
players G1 and G2, in order to take their decision, need also to interact with
their environments R1 and R2. Contrary to what happens for the players,
whose situation can be described in a simple four-dimensional Hilbert space,
these environments are naturally defined in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert
9
space. For this reason, they can be thought to describe some sub-system
with infinite (or very many) degrees of freedom, as the neurons in the brain,
for instance. If we adopt this interpretation, Rj can be seen as the neural
system of Gj, j = 1, 2.
The full Hamiltonian H, see [19], is the following:
H = H0 +HI +Hint,
H0 =
∑2
j=1 ωjb
†
jbj +
∑2
j=1
∫
R Ωj(k)B
†
j (k)Bj(k) dk,
HI =
∑2
j=1 λj
∫
R
(
bjB
†
j (k) +Bj(k)b
†
j
)
dk
Hint = µex
(
b†1b2 + b
†
2b1
)
+ µcoop
(
b†1b
†
2 + b2b1
)
.
(3)
Here ωj, λj, µex and µcoop are real quantities, and Ωj(k) are real functions.
In analogy with the bj’s, we use fermionic operators Bj(k) and B
†
j (k) to
describe the environment:
{Bi(k), Bl(q)†} = δi,lδ(k − q) 1 , {Bi(k), Bj(k)} = 0, (4)
which have to be added to those in (2). Moreover each b]j anti-commutes
with each B]j(k): {b]j, B]l (k)} = 0 for all j, l and k. Here X] stands for
X or X†. The various terms of H can be understood as follows: (1) H0
is the free Hamiltonian, which produces no time evolution for the strategy
operators nˆj. This is because [H0, nˆj] = 0, and because H reduces to H0
in the absence of interactions (i.e. when λj = µex = µcoop = 0). This is in
agreement with our idea that the strategies of G1 and G2 can be modified
only in the presence of interactions. (2) HI describes the interaction between
the players and their neural systems. Of course, the one discussed here is
a special kind of interaction, which is useful since it produces an analytical
solution for the time evolution of (the mean values of) the strategy operators.
Other choices could be considered, but these would, quite likely, break down
this nice aspect of the model. (3) Hint describes two different interactions
between G1 and G2 . When µcoop = 0 the two players act differently, while
they behave in the same way when µex = 0. Of course, when both µcoop and
µex are not zero, the dynamics are even richer. We refer to [19] for more
details on (3).
The Heisenberg equations of motion X˙(t) = i[H,X(t)] can now be de-
duced by using the CAR (2) and (4) and using H given in (3):
b˙1(t) = −iω1b1(t) + iλ1
∫
RB1(k, t) dk − iµexb2(t)− iµcoopb†2(t),
b˙2(t) = −iω2b2(t) + iλ2
∫
RB2(k, t) dk − iµexb1(t) + iµcoopb†1(t),
B˙j(k, t) = −iΩj(k)Bj(k, t) + iλjbj(t),
(5)
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j = 1, 2. The solution of this system of equations has been found similarly
to [19], and it looks like:
b(t) = ei U tb(0) + i
∫ t
0
ei U (t−t1) β(t1) dt1, (6)
where we have introduced the following quantities:
b(t) =

b1(t)
b2(t)
b†1(t)
b†2(t)
 , β(t) =

λ1β1(t)
λ2β2(t)
−λ1β†1(t)
−λ2β†2(t)
 , U =

iν1 −µex 0 −µcoop
−µex iν2 µcoop 0
0 µcoop iν1 µex
−µcoop 0 µex iν2
 ,
and where Ωj(k) = Ωjk, Ωj > 0, νj = iωj+pi
λ2j
Ωj
and βj(t) =
∫
RBj(k)e
−iΩjkt dk,
j = 1, 2.
As already stated, the next step consists in taking the average of the time
evolution of the strategy operators, nˆj(t) = b
†
j(t)bj(t), on a state over the full
system S = SG ⊗R, where SG has already been introduced, SG = {G1,G2},
and R = {R1,R2}. These states are assumed to be tensor products of vector
states for SG and states on the environment in the following way: for each
operator of the form XS⊗YR, XS being an operator of SG and YR an operator
of the environment, we have
〈XS ⊗ YR〉 := 〈Ψ0, XSΨ0〉 ωR(YR).
Here Ψ0 is the vector introduced in (1), while ωR(.) is a state satisfying the
following standard properties, see [60]:
ωR(1R) = 1, ωR(Bj(k)) = ωR(B
†
j (k)) = 0, ωR(B
†
j (k)Bl(q)) = Nj δj,lδ(k−q),
(7)
for some constant Nj. Also, ωR(Bj(k)Bl(q)) = 0, for all j and l.
Remark: At first sight, this expression for the state on S introduces a
sort of asymmetry between SG and R, since their states look of a different
nature: the one over SG is a vector state, whilst the one over R is a lin-
ear positive functional over the algebra of the fermionic operators Bj(k) and
B†j (k). This is not really surprising, since SG involves just two degrees of
freedom, while R involves an infinite number of degrees of freedom. Never-
theless, using the so-called Gelfand-Naimark-Segal-construction (see [45]), it
is possible to present ωR as a vector state.
After a few computations, calling V (t) = ei U t and Vk,l(t) its (k, l)-matrix
element, we deduce the following general formulas for the Decision functions
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(DFs) of G1 and G2, which extend those found in [19] in absence of interfer-
ence:

n1(t) =
〈(
b†1(t)b1(t)
)†〉
= µ
(G)
1 (t) + δµ
(G)
1 (t) + n
(B)
1 (t),
n2(t) =
〈(
b†2(t)b2(t)
)†〉
= µ
(G)
2 (t) + δµ
(G)
2 (t) + n
(B)
2 (t).
(8)
Here, we have introduced
µ
(G)
1 (t) = |V1,1(t)|2
(|α1,0|2 + |α1,1|2)+ |V1,2(t)|2 (|α0,1|2 + |α1,1|2)+
+ |V1,3(t)|2
(|α0,0|2 + |α0,1|2)+ |V1,4(t)|2 (|α0,0|2 + |α1,0|2)
µ
(G)
2 (t) = |V2,1(t)|2
(|α1,0|2 + |α1,1|2)+ |V2,2(t)|2 (|α0,1|2 + |α1,1|2)+
+ |V2,3(t)|2
(|α0,0|2 + |α0,1|2)+ |V2,4(t)|2 (|α0,0|2 + |α1,0|2) ,
(9)

δµ
(G)
1 (t) = 2<
[
V1,1(t)V1,2(t)α1,0 α0,1 + V1,1(t)V1,4(t)α1,1 α0,0
]
+
−2<
[
V1,2(t)V1,3(t)α1,1 α0,0 + V1,3(t)V1,4(t)α0,1 α1,0
]
,
δµ
(G)
2 (t) = 2<
[
V2,1(t)V2,2(t)α1,0 α0,1 + V2,1(t)V2,4(t)α1,1 α0,0
]
+
−2<
[
V2,2(t)V2,3(t)α1,1 α0,0 + V2,3(t)V2,4(t)α0,1 α1,0
]
,
(10)
and
n
(B)
1 (t) = 2pi
∫ t
0
dt1
[
λ21
Ω1
(|V1,1(t− t1)|2N1 + |V1,3(t− t1)|2(1−N1))
]
+
+2pi
∫ t
0
dt1
[
λ22
Ω2
(|V1,2(t− t1)|2N2 + |V1,4(t− t1)|2(1−N4))
]
,
n
(B)
2 (t) = 2pi
∫ t
0
dt1
[
λ21
Ω1
(|V2,1(t− t1)|2N1 + |V2,3(t− t1)|2(1−N1))
]
+
+2pi
∫ t
0
dt1
[
λ22
Ω2
(|V2,2(t− t1)|2N2 + |V2,4(t− t1)|2(1−N4))
]
.
(11)
In formula (8) we have clearly divided contributions of three different natures:
µ
(G)
j (t) contains contributions only due to the players G1 and G2. Their an-
alytic expressions become particularly simple if the initial state Ψ0 is just
one of the vectors ϕj,k, i.e. if all the coefficients αk,l in (1) are zero, ex-
cept one. In this particular situation, all the contributions in δµ
(G)
j (t), which
again only ref er to G1 and G2, are zero. For this reason, we call δµ(G)1 (t) and
δµ
(G)
2 (t) interference terms : they are only present if Ψ0 is some superposition
of eigenvectors of the (time zero) number operators. Otherwise, they simply
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disappear. Finally, n
(B)
1 (t) and n
(B)
2 (t) arise because of the interaction of the
players with the environments: as we see from (11), they are both zero if λ1
and λ2 in the Hamiltonian are both equal to zero, and they do not depend
on the explicit form of Ψ0.
A detailed analysis of what happens when there are no interference terms
can be found in [19], where the focus was mainly on the asymptotic behavior
of the DFs in absence of interferences. Here, on the other hand, we want
to analyze what happens when the interference does exist already at t = 0
(i.e. when more than just one coefficient αj,k is non zero), and we are also
interested in the behavior of the DFs for finite time.
4 Analysis of the results
In the figures plotted in this section we will call C1 the following choice of
parameters of H: ω1 = 1, ω2 = 2, Ω1 = Ω2 = 0.1, λ1 = λ2 = 0.5, and C2
the second choice: ω1 = 0.1, ω2 = 0.2, Ω1 = Ω2 = 1, λ1 = 1 and λ2 = 0.7.
Also, we call Cα,1 and Cα,2 the following choices of the parameters αk,l in (1):
Cα,1 = {αk,l = 12 ,∀ k, l}, while Cα,2 = {α0,1 = 12 = −α1,1, α0,0 = i2 = −α1,0}.
Of course, several other choices could also be considered. However, the
ones we are fixing here cover already different situations. In particular, while
in C1 the interaction parameters λ1 and λ2 are equal, they are different in C2.
Also, while in C1 each ωj is bigger than each Ωk, the opposite holds for C2.
This is important, since it is known that the ωj’s are related to the inertia of
the player Gj (see [18], [19]). Moreover, as for the choices Cα,1 and Cα,2, the
difference is clear: in Cα,1 all the coefficients in (1) are equal, and in particular
there is no relative phase between the various ϕk,l’s in Ψ0, whilst this is not
so when adopting the choice Cα,2. And, as we will see, this makes indeed a big
difference: we clearly see that, even if (as expected from what is deduced in
[19]) the asymptotic values of the two DFs appear to be independent of the
choice of Cα,1 and Cα,2, there exists a certain time window in which the choice
of the αk,l’s really change the behaviors of the functions. More concretely,
if we add a phase in the coefficients defining the original vector Ψ0, we may
observe quite large oscillations. Then, interference terms in Ψ0 make it, in
general, quite difficult to get a decision. In particular, this is the effect of the
relative phases in the interference coefficients (see Figure 1, right), while if
these coefficients have all the same phases, a decision can be reached quite
soon (see Figure 1, left). However, if we wait for a sufficiently long time, in
both cases we reach the same final values of the DFs: the asymptotic values
of the DFs only depend on the state of the environment, and not on the
particular choice of Ψ0.
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Figure 1: The DFs n1(t) (up) and n2(t) (down) for parameters C1, N1 = 0, N2 = 1,
µex = 500, µcoop = 0 and for Cα,1 (left) and Cα,2 (right).
These conclusions are confirmed by other choices of the state on the
environment. For instance, in Figure 2 we plot again the DFs for the choices
Cα,1 (left) and Cα,2 (right) and for the same choice of the parameters as in
Figure 1, while the state of the environment is chosen different, since we take
now N1 = N2 = 1. We see that there is no particular difference between
the two DFs n1(t) and n2(t) (this is possibly due to the fact that N1 = N2).
However, adding the phases to the αk,l creates, again, a lot of noise in the
decision making process, noise which disappears, but only after a sufficiently
long time.
It is useful to stress that, changing further the parameters of the Hamilto-
nian, does not really affect our conclusions. Indeed, Figure 3 shows that even
with different choices of the parameters in H, the choice C2 with µex = 100
(rather than µex = 500, as in the previous figures), phases create noise, and,
again, this noise becomes smaller and smaller after some time.
In this case, the existence of an asymptotic limit for the DFs is less
evident, but this is only due to the small time interval considered. It is not
hard to imagine that we could still recover a clear asymptotic value for nj(t)
if we consider a time interval larger than just [0, 0.5]. However, we will not
do this here in order to keep range of the figures uniform.
So far, we have taken µcoop = 0. The same behavior is observed if we take
µcoop 6= 0: we could check (but we do not include the plots here) that the
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Figure 2: The DFs n1(t) (up) and n2(t) (down) for parameters C1, N1 = 1, N2 = 1,
µex = 500, µcoop = 0 and for Cα,1 (left) and Cα,2 (right).
choice Cα,2 is again much more noisy than Cα,1.
Also, no particular difference arises if we consider both µex and µcoop
different from zero, especially when they are different enough (again, we do
not include the plots here). However, interestingly enough, this noise is not
so evident if µex and µcoop are not so different, see Figure 4. It seems that,
when the two terms in Hint, see (3), act in cooperation, they become capable
to filter the noise, making the effect of the phases in αk,l not so strong. This
is an interesting feature, which is surely worthy of a deeper analysis.
5 Discussion
In this section we shall discuss the output of our model in detail.
5.1 State’s interpretation
As is well known, the present situation in quantum foundations is character-
ized by a huge diversity of interpretations of the quantum state. The two
main classes of interpretations correspond to the statistical and individual
viewpoints on a quantum state (see Khrennikov [55]) for details. By the for-
mer a quantum state encodes probabilities for the results of measurements
for an ensemble of identically prepared quantum systems.
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Figure 3: The DFs n1(t) (up) and n2(t) (down) for parameters C2, N1 = 0, N2 = 1,
µex = 100, µcoop = 0 and for Cα,1 (left) and Cα,2 (right).
We investigated the behavior of the averages of the strategy operators of
the two players G1 and G2 interacting with the corresponding environments
(‘mental baths’) R1 and R2. One of the main outputs of our quantum-like
model is that these averages stabilize for t → ∞ (for natural Hamiltonians
describing the interaction between players and their interactions with mental
baths). To interpret this result, we have to fix one of the interpretations of
a quantum state.
The straightforward interpretation of this stabilization result can be pre-
sented on the basis of the statistical interpretation of quantum states. Here
we consider a very large ensemble of pairs of players and the averages of the
strategy operators are treated as the ensemble averages. Our stabilization
result implies that on average (with respect to this ensemble) the strategies
of players stabilize to fixed values in the very long run of the decision making
reflections (this is encoded in creation and annihilation operators forming
the Hamiltonian of the game).
Now we switch to the individual interpretation of a quantum state. Here
the question of the interpretation of probabilities encoded in a quantum
state is more complicated than in the case of the statistical interpretation. It
seems that, for our applications of the mathematical formalism of quantum
mechanics to the operational modeling of decision making, the most natural
interpretation of probability is the subjective interpretation. Recently this in-
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Figure 4: The DFs n1(t) (up) and n2(t) (down) for parameters C1, N1 = 0, N2 = 1,
µex = 10, µcoop = 10 and for Cα,1 (left) and Cα,2 (right).
terpretation became popular in quantum information theory and it is known
as QBism (Quantum Bayesianism) (see [56], [57])9.
In the QBist framework the average stabilization output of our model can
be interpreted in the following way:
At the initial instant of time t = 0, each pair of players assigns their
individual subjective probabilities to selections of their strategies,
pi(j) ≡ pi(j; 0), i = 1, 2, j = 0, 1.
These probabilities depend on the initial state Ψ0 of the pair of players. By
using the representation of Ψ0 as superposition of the ‘certainty states’ ϕk,l,
see (1), and Born’s rule, these probabilities can be represented as
p1(j) = |αj,0|2 + |αj,1|2, p2(j) = |α0,j|2 + |α1,j|2,
9We do not claim that QBism is the proper interpretation of quantum physics. See
Khrennikov [55] for reflections from one of the authors of this paper on the applicability
of QBism in quantum physics. But it is very natural to use it for our purpose (see
[33]; [55]) for a motivation. We also remark that originally classical game theory and
the theory of decision making was formulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern [7] in
the statistical probabilistic framework: probabilities were treated from the frequentist
viewpoint. However, Savage [48] reformulated it by using the subjectivist viewpoint on
probability. Nowadays the latter is dominating the foundations of decision making and the
axiomatic foundation of economics, but with the strong emphasize of the role of Bayesian
inference.
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for j = 0, 1. In fact, for instance, we have p1(0) = | 〈ϕ00,Ψ0〉 |2 + | 〈ϕ01,Ψ0〉 |2,
and so on. If Ψ0 is non-factorizable (entangled), then, p1(j) cannot be ex-
pressed solely in terms of the state of G1 and vice versa. We emphasize that
in the case of entanglement, for a pure state Ψ0, the states of players are
mixed states and they are represented by density operators.
Starting with the initial state Ψ0, and hence with the probabilities pi(j),
each decision maker updates continuously her state by taking into account
the impact of the environment and the feedback from the update of the state
of the co-player. This state dynamics studied in previous sections generates
the corresponding dynamics of the subjective probabilities, t→ pi(j; t). The
essence of exploring the quantum-like model indicates that the genuine dy-
namics are not a dynamics of probabilities, but rather a dynamics of the
state. Metaphorically we can say that the dynamics of probabilities are a
shadow of the mental state dynamics. The state dynamics can be expressed,
see Section 3, in terms of the strategy operators.
A direct computation shows that the strategy operators nˆi (at t = 0) can
be represented in the form (spectral decomposition):
nˆ1 = |ϕ1,0〉〈ϕ1,0|+ |ϕ1,1〉〈ϕ1,1|; (12)
nˆ2 = |ϕ0,1〉〈ϕ0,1|+ |ϕ1,1〉〈ϕ1,1|, (13)
where (|f〉〈g|)h = 〈g, h〉 f , for all f, g, h ∈ H. The ones in (12)-(13) are
orthogonal projectors onto the subspaces L1 with the basis (ϕ1,0, ϕ1,1) and
L2 with the basis (ϕ0,1, ϕ11). Those are the specifics of the fermionic repre-
sentation of the reflection and strategy operators.
Now, with simple manipulations, we observe that
p1(1; t) = | 〈ϕ10,Ψ(t)〉 |2+| 〈ϕ11,Ψ(t)〉 |2 = 〈Ψ(t), (|ϕ1,0〉〈ϕ1,0|+ |ϕ1,1〉〈ϕ1,1|) Ψ(t)〉 =
= 〈Ψ(t), nˆ1Ψ(t)〉 = 〈Ψ0, nˆ1(t)Ψ0〉 ,
moving from the Schro¨dinger to the Heisenberg representation. Therefore,
the averages of these operators, i = 1, 2, are equal to the probabilities to
select the decision s = 1
pi(1; t) = 〈nˆi(t)〉, i = 1, 2. (14)
These are nothing else than DFs considered in section 3, see (8). This clarifies
the relation between the subjective probabilities and the decision functions.
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5.2 The process of decision making: the subjective
probability viewpoint
Each decision maker starts with assignment of the subjective probabilities
pi(1) = 〈nˆi〉, pi(0) = 1 − 〈nˆi〉, where nˆi = nˆi(0). Then she begins her reflec-
tions on the possible selections of the strategies (adapted to the environment
and interactions with the other decision maker) and her subjective probabil-
ities fluctuate, see Sections 3, 4.
We have seen that the structure of fluctuations depends crucially on the
initial state Ψ0. In the process of decision making, the magnitude of these
fluctuations decreases and subjective probabilities stabilize to the fixed val-
ues. These are the probabilities which are used by the decision maker to
make her choice. After the determination of her subjective probabilities, she
proceeds as a classical decision maker. For the instant of time t, the odds in
favor of the decision labeled by 1 are given by the proportion:
Oi(1; t) =
pi(1; t)
pi(0; t)
. (15)
We consider the instance of time τ when the decision is made. This τ cor-
responds to a diminishing of the fluctuations to the minimal level. In the
theoretical model τ =∞. But in reality a decision maker cannot wait for an
infinite time to make the decision. The decision maker uses some threshold
for fluctuations  > 0 and the decision instant τ is determined by .
If Oi(1; τ) > 1, then Gi makes the decision labeled by 1. If Oi(1; τ) < 1,
then she makes the opposite decision (if Oi(1; τ) = 1, she either makes the
decision randomly with probability 1/2 or she repeats the process of decision
making with a modified initial state Ψ0). We remark that in the absence of
the mental baths, the subjective probabilities assigned by a decision maker
to the possible strategies would fluctuate for ever, as deduced, for instance,
in [20] in a different context.
5.3 Violation of the law of total probability: ‘interfer-
ence of probabilities’
As was emphasized by Feynman and Hibbs [62], the probabilistic data from
interference experiments with quantum systems, e.g. the two slit experiment,
can be treated as violating the laws of classical probability. They pointed
to a violation of the additivity of probability. Feynman’s argument was
reformulated by one of the coauthors of this paper in terms of conditional
probabilities - as a violation of the law of total probability (LTP) [35]. In this
form, this argument is nicely applicable to the process of decision making.
19
The classical Bayesian scheme of decision making is fundamentally based on
the LTP. Its violation leads to non-Bayesian schemes of decision making and
the quantum formalism provides one of such schemes10.
We recall the LTP. Consider two random variable ξ and η taking discrete
values, ξ = α1, ..., αN and η = β1, ..., βM . Then, in the classical probabilis-
tic framework (the measure-theoretic model of probability (see Kolmogorov,
1933) it can be proven that:
p(η = β) =
∑
α
p(ξ = α)p(η = β|ξ = α). (16)
It is important to remark that the conditional probability is defined by
the Bayes formula: p(η = β|ξ = α) = p(η = β, ξ = α)/p(ξ = α), where
p(η = β, ξ = α) is the joint probability distribution of the pair of random
variables. As is well known, in general, for quantum observables, the joint
probability is not well defined. Therefore, the classical Bayes formula for con-
ditional probabilities is in-applicable and one can expect that, for quantum
conditional probabilities which are defined in the Hilbert space formalism,
the formula (16) can be violated [35].
The classical LTP in our setting can be formulated as follows. We remind
that the probabilities pi(s; t), s = 0, 1, depend on the initial state Ψ0, i.e., in
fact, we could even use the notation pi(s; t|Ψ0). Among the possible initial
mental states of the pairs of players (G1,G2), the states ϕk,m, k,m = 0, 1, play
the very special role. Here initially the players were completely sure in their
strategies, G1 with the strategy k and G2 with the strategy m. In (16) the
probabilities pi(s; t|k,m) ≡ pi(s; t|ϕk,m), s = 0, 1, can be identified with the
conditional probabilities p(η = β|ξ = α) with α = (k,m) and β = 0, 1. The
probabilities
pi(k,m) = |〈Ψ0|ϕk,m〉|2, k,m = 0, 1, (17)
encode uncertainty in the determination of the pairs of strategies (k,m) for
the initial mental state Ψ0. In (16) they are identified with the probabilities
p(ξ = α).
The interference-like representation of the decision functions (8) can be
rewritten as a quantum generalization of LTP:
pi(s; t) =
∑
(k,m)
pi(k,m)pi(s; t|k,m) (18)
10Of course, a non-Bayesian scheme need not to be precisely quantum. It is not clear
whether the quantum formalism can cover all probabilistic phenomena arising in decision
making [22], [23].
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+
∑
(k,m) 6=(j,n)
cos θi(s; t|(k,m, j, n)
√
pi(k,m)pi(s; t|k,m)pi(j, n)pi(α; t|j, n)
Here the phase θi(s; t|(k,m, j, n) encodes a sort of interference between the
pairs of strategies (k,m) and (j, n). In our quantum model this phase can be
easily calculated by using the phases of the states Ψ0 and ϕk,m, ϕj,n.
As was shown in [35], in the purely probabilistic framework (i.e. with-
out direct appealing to the Hilbert space formalism) a violation of the LTP
means the impossibility to embed all probabilities in (18), into a single classi-
cal probability space. Thus, the appearance of the additional interference-like
term disturbing the classical LTP, see (18), shows that classical probability
has the restricted domain of applications. For our applications to decision
making, it is more useful to interpret this result in terms of the interrela-
tion between classical and nonclassical logics. Classical probability theory is
based on classical Boolean logic. Therefore, the impossibility to use classical
probability implies the impossibility to use the Boolean logic. Thus, in our
quantum-like model the actions of the players are not ruled solely by the
laws of Boolean logics. They can make decisions with reasoning based on
non-classical logic.
6 Conclusions and perspectives
The DM under uncertainty plays a crucial role in economics, game theory
and many areas of social science. Until now, the most intensive and success-
ful modeling of the DM-process was performed on the basis of Bernoulli’s
idea to explore utility functions (which originated in his attempting to solve
the St. Petersburg paradox). Several theories have ensued since then: ex-
pected utility theory, prospect theory, cumulative prospect theory and other
approaches. In spite of the aforementioned success of these utility based mod-
els, it is impossible to ignore the growing dissatisfaction by the present state
of the art in DM. In particular, the number of paradoxes have increased over
the years: Allais, Ellsberg, Machina and one recently counted 39 paradoxes
(see [54]). Already, in subjective uncertainty utility models, the representa-
tion of the agent’s utility by a function is a fuzzy problem. Individuals may
use a huge variety of possible utility functions and the determination of the
class of possible functions is a complicated problem (see Machina [50], [52],
[53]).
One can treat DM as the interaction of an agent with a complex infor-
mation environment which includes a variety of behavioral, economic, social,
and geopolitical factors as well as beliefs about states of other agents (e.g. the
financial market). Therefore, it is natural to model DM as an (environment-
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)adaptive dynamical process. In principle, one may try to encode such a
complex information environment by a single function encoding the utility
of a context. However, this would definitely be a high simplification of the
mathematical representation of the DM-context.
The most advanced mathematical model of interaction of a system with
an environment is presented in quantum theory. The modern quantum infor-
mation viewpoint on quantum theory (see Brukner and Zeilinger [47], 1999
and also Chiribella [46] and Plotnitsky [40]) justifies the possibility to apply
this formalism outside of physics. Here the keyword is adaptivity to the en-
vironment. In this paper we have applied the quantum model of adaptive
dynamics to the modeling of the DM-process. Our model is QFT-inspired:
the information environment is modeled with the aid of quantum fields which
are treated as operational quantities carrying information. In such a DM-
model, an agent does not maximize (expected) utility, but she searches for
decisions matching ‘demands’ of the environment and (agent’s representa-
tion) of the belief-states of other agents involved in the DM-process. This
dynamical adaptive process is based on the representation of the DM-context
by a quantum pure state carrying maximal available information about the
situation.
We have found analytical and numerical solutions for operator-valued
functions representing the DM-process and their expectations, and we con-
sidered the problem of stabilization for t → ∞. The output of stabilization
is considered as the classical (mixed) decision strategy. Of course, the real
DM-process cannot take an infinite time and we are interested in approxi-
mate stabilization. We have carefully analyzed the interpretational issues of
our model (see section 5). In particular, we have looked at the coupling be-
tween subjective probability and the private agent interpretation of quantum
mechanics (QBism) (see Fuchs and Schack [56], [57]).
This paper is of a conceptual nature. Its aim is to present a quite general
model of DM under uncertainty as an adaptive dynamical process of evolu-
tion of the belief state of an agent interacting with a complex information
environment (e.g., the financial market). This paper also wants to demon-
strate the mathematical power of this general model. Our proposed model
can be explored for a variety of problems in economics, sociology, and politics.
See Bagarello [19], [20], [21] and Khrennikova [38]11 for concrete applications
of special variations of the presented model. Others are in progress.
11We remark that the QFT-inspired model generalizes the quantum dynamical DM-
model of Pothos and Busemeyer [42]. It also has close connections with the dynamical
DM-model based on the quantum master equation (see Asano et al. [14], [15], [16], [17]).
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